The Vatsa Conspiracy
By Dr. Nowa Omoigui
[SOUTH CAROLINA, U.S.A.]
nowa_o@yahoo.com
In Nigeria, beginning in the wee hours of December 17th, 1985 and extending for the next two weeks, over one hundred airforce, army and naval officers were arrested enmasse for allegedly plotting to overthrow the 4 month old government of Major General Ibrahim Babangida who had himself come to power on August 27, 1985 in a palace coup against Major General Buhari. After a Preliminary Special Investigation Panel chaired by Brigadier Sani Sami, selected cases were forwarded for court martial. Beginning on Monday 27th January 1986, 17 officers were tried at the Brigade of Guards HQ in Victoria Island, Lagos, by a Special Military Tribunal. The Tribunal was convened by Major General DY Bali, then Minister of Defence and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the Treason and other offences (Special Military Tribunal) Decree No.1 of 1986 with reference to Section 37(2) of the Criminal code. Separately, Brigadier Malami Nassarawa, Wing Commander J Uku, and Lt. Peter Odoba were also tried on different charges. Squadron Leader Effanga and Wing Commander Ekanem were discharged and acquitted in a no-case submission.
The Tribunal comprised Major General Charles B. Ndiomu (Chairman), Brigadier Yerima Y Kure, Commodore Murtala A. Nyako, Colonel Rufus Kupolati, Group Captain Anthony Ikhazobor (later replaced by Colonel Opaleye when Lt. Col Bitiyong objected to his presence), Lt. Col. D. Mohammed and Alhaji Mamman Nassarawa (Commissioner of Police). There were two waiting members, namely Col. E. B. Opaleye (until he replaced Ikhazobor), and Lt. Col. M M Bukar. The Judge Advocate was Major A. Kejawa. The prosecution team comprised Colonel Lawrence Uwumarogie, Major N N Madza, Major B Makanju, and Captain Y. A. Ahmadu. The trial was conducted under the watchful eyes of the military intelligence directorate headed at that time by Colonel Akilu.
The following were accused: Major-Gen Mamman Vatsa, Lt. Col. Musa Bitiyong, Lt. Col. Christian A. Oche, Lt. Col. Michael A. Iyorshe, Lt. Col. M. Effiong, Major D. I. Bamidele, Major D. E. West, Major J. O. Onyeke, Major Tobias G. Akwashiki, Captain G.I.L. Sese, Lt. K.G. Dapka, Commander A. A. Ogwiji, Wing Commander B. E. N. Ekele, Wing Commander Adamu C. Sakaba, Squadron Leader Martin Olufolorunsho Luther, Squadron Leader C. Ode and Squadron Leader A. Ahura.
It was alleged that the plot was financed by General Vatsa using the cover of a farming loan to Lt. Col Musa Bitiyong. General Vatsa denied any intent that monies he had given to Bitiyong were meant for that purpose, but Bitiyong allegedly shared some of it for travel expenses with two other accused officers and was said (at a meeting in Makurdi, which Vatsa did not attend) to have promised to get more from the source when it became obvious that funding a coup in Nigeria would require much more than the 10,000 naira he allegedly had at his disposal (As of 1985, it was said that a coup would require no less than 50-100,000 naira to implement). However, at no point in time did Vatsa actually meet with or discuss coup plotting or financing with anyone-else. Indeed, other than Bitiyong, who had a close relationship with the General, the other alleged key conspirators, I am told, never viewed themselves as working for or on behalf of Vatsa, although for lack of funds, two of them reluctantly accepted using part of the "farm money" for odds and ends. Sources say, however, that Vatsa maintained to the very end that the money was for farming. Others allege, however, that after being tortured for two days, Bitiyong implicated Vatsa by
making reference to certain private political conversations they had, which Vatsa denied. But Vatsa was accused of harboring "bad blood" against his friend and classmate Babangida, dating back to the Buhari regime and possibly earlier. He was also obliquely accused of reporting Babangida's coup plot to Buhari before he left the country for pilgrimage along with Major General Tunde Idiagbon in August. Actions he later took as a Minister to accelerate many military applications for certificates of occupancy for land in Abuja, came to be viewed as efforts to buy support among one or two of the plotters. Then rumors that a civilian had introduced him at a party as Nigeria's next President were even aired. All of this is of course circumstantial. But they took him to the stake, which was quite an anti-climax to the career of a brilliant man who (until then, if the government is to be believed) never took part in any coup in Nigeria. Indeed, Mamman Vatsa was the first to go on air in Calabar to denounce the Dimka coup and was later the Secretary of the Obada panel that tried Dimka and others in 1976 (see The Dimka's Coup Attempt of February 13, 1976). This little detail may have earned him some latent enmity in certain circles of the Army which later contributed to his death.
Very briefly, the basic outlines of the alleged Vatsa conspiracy of 1985, as one can glean from publications and interviews is as follows: Lt. Col. Musa Bitiyong, based in Lagos, held a discussion [about the removal of Buhari] when General Vatsa came back from Mecca in August 1985. Bitiyong urgently sent for Lt. Col Iyorshe to come down from Kaduna in September 1985. The young Captain who acted as an innocent go-between was later charged but acquitted. Bitiyong then presented Iyorshe with documents alleging serious acts of impropriety against certain personalities in the new régime with regards to army and defence equipment maintenance contracts. Being the puritanical, very professional and highly moralistic officer he was, the usually unflappable Iyorshe got upset. In October he discussed the matter further with Lt. Col Oche of military intelligence who also allegedly revealed other allegedly incriminating documents related to trafficking, particularly as it affected the release of some persons who had previously been detained by the Buhari regime.
Concerns then emerged about the long-term threat of the new regime to the military as a disciplined professional fighting organization and the country as a whole, through the legitimization of serial coups in which the same characters always featured. It was felt that Nigeria deserved better and that the armed forces should be saved from corruption and professional decay. This basic concern for professional ethos was amplified by concerns that the new regime intended to take the IMF loan and plunge the country into poverty. As Lt. Col Iyorshe, reportedly put it:
"What I personally feel is that the nation itself needed a better deal. There have always been people whose only ambition is to lead, not serving any national interest. There has always been individual, tribal or business rights, never the rights of this nation to a better image; social, economic, political and military programs and plans. Nigeria deserves a group of people or leaders transparently honest enough to publish all their assets and liabilities on the pages of newspapers for the world to see. Not a nation where anybody will be allowed to have a foreign bank account let alone the millions stored away. The nation should be such that any Nigerian regardless of his tribe or religion will have the right to aspire to the leadership or rulership of the country. Nigeria was fast sinking to a state of despondency and anarchy. They never and still never trust their leaders. The anarchy at our airports characterises the state of the nation. Corruption is rife in this country and transcends all spheres of life. It is something the nation has to
solve. Professional incompetence and mediocrity are rewarded whereas hard work is mocked.
Within the military, the situation was and still is very tense. The welfare of soldiers is totally neglected such that soldiers still live in batchers over ten years after the civil war; no uniforms, no drugs in the hospitals; soldiers are being subjected to too much guard duties, little or no chance to themselves and their families. The discipline in the army in particular was deteriorating rapidly as exemplified by the report of what happened in Lagos on August 27th, 1985.
The question of leadership was not discussed quite seriously, but it was with one exception, felt that the army had always dominated leadership. This was not an issue anyway as there were no solid plans regarding such things, the method of operation and the question of finance. I never considered myself for any higher military or political appointments. In fact, at first, all of us believed that if we succeeded, some senior officers of honesty would be called to rule.
Personally up till quite recently, I never believed that coups solve any problem or else Bolivia would be paradise on earth. But then things seemed to get worse and worse."
What Col. Iyorshe was referring to by "the report of what happened in Lagos on August 27th, 1985" is the fact that soldiers who took part in the coup that brought General Babangida to power looted the personal property and possessions of General Buhari in Lagos. What he did not mention, however, was that a similar thing took place when President Shagari was overthrown by Buhari and others in December 1983. Many of his life long priceless records and possessions have never been found to this day.
In part because of the concern that the Army's armored corps was packed with officers loyal to the new regime, certain air force officers were then contacted (Martin Luther/Ben Ekele) and two meetings held, one informal meet in late November at the Sheraton Hotel Lobby in Lagos (Luther, Oche, Ogwiji, Bitiyong) and the other at a guest house in Makurdi (Iyorshe, Bitiyong, Oche, Ekele, Sakaba, Bamidele). Aside this, Iyorshe and Bitiyong are said to have met a few times either in Lagos or Kaduna but there (reportedly) were no other meetings involving others. Ogwiji, who was a Naval Officer, was invited (without prior knowledge) to the Sheraton meeting by his friend Oche. However, no operational role was defined or envisaged for the Navy. According to sources, the meeting was focused on political criticisms of the regime. Although conceivably seditious, no operational coup plans were discussed. Ogwiji made no further contacts with anyone.
At the Makurdi meeting, the potential role of the airforce was discussed. The technical limitations preventing the use of either the MiG 21 or the Sepecat Jaguar in a ground attack role to neutralize pro-regime armored vehicles at the Ikeja Cantonment in Lagos were made clear by Ben Ekele (and supported by Adamu Sakaba) who advised the army boys that the air force could not play any useful role. This discussion was, however, taken out of context and the public told that the conspirators planned to destroy Lagos.
Before the meeting ended, Sakaba, who had supposedly been invited by his friend Ekele, even floated a totally fake competing coup plot (using the names of a group of officers) to which he said he belonged, as a decoy to dissuade the others in the group from proceeding. Aside this, it was obvious that the group had no troops on the ground in Lagos, although the theoretical possibility existed
that Iyorshe could use demonstration troops at the Command and Staff College in Jaji. Hence the meeting broke up with no concrete operational plan nor was there any agreement to use force although some key elements (notably Iyorshe, Bitiyong and Oche) continued to monitor the national situation as well as investigate the so called "Group of Brigade Commanders" Sakaba had told them about.
The Army at that time was awash with rumors of coup plots by different groups. Everyone was watching everyone. The bragadaccio and 'compensation' of the "boys" who carried out the August 27 operation did not help the morale of serious minded officers.
Separately, other isolated discussions were held between certain officers. Wing Commander Uku, for example, potentially attractive on account of his command of the Alpha Jets at Kainji, repeatedly refused to be drawn in and strongly advised against air force participation. This fine officer was later charged with and jailed for concealment because he did not report the attempt to recruit him.
Ideas such as the diversion of the Presidential jet to a pre-arranged location by Pilots in the Executive Fleet (like Luther and Ahura) were floated in other isolated conversations between some officers in Lagos. This scenario posited arresting the C-in-C and confronting him with allegations after which he would be asked to resign. But, again, no actual plans were made.
Oche allegedly met with Majors Akwashiki and Onyeke after a game of squash in Lagos and discussed national issues like the IMF loan, possibly to evaluate their suitability for recruitment. But he never actually mentioned planning a coup with either officer.
Akwashiki was still sentenced to death anyway, only to have his sentence commuted by the ruling council. Some people claim incredulously that he was punished for not knowing he was being recruited by those who felt he owed them his sensitive position as the Commander of the 6th Battalion, Bonny Camp. He was later pardoned and released back to private life almost ten years later by a successor regime.
Oche allegedly mentioned the existence of a conspiracy to his nephew, Peter Odoba, a young lieutenant at the Guards Brigade who then reported to a colleague of his, then Lt. (later Major) Al Mustapha, then Intelligence officer to the Chief of Army Staff. Oche's nephew was, however, later charged with concealment and recommended for dismissal and a long jail term.
Conflicting accounts abound about the precise nature of links between Iyorshe, Bamidele, West and Effiong, all based in the Kaduna/Zaria area. Iyorshe and Bamidele were executed. Effiong's death sentence was commuted. Bamidele's case raised an interesting side dilemma of how an officer (Bamidele) reported a coup plot in 1983 to his boss (Buhari) only to get arrested and charged for plotting. Then he saw this same boss who arrested him emerge as Nigeria's new leader a few months later after a coup. The same officer (Bamidele) was then shot for allegedly knowing of and participating in another coup 2 years later without reporting to his boss. These, among many other areas are subject to future research, the memoirs of direct participants or the release of actual investigative, court and AFRC records, not publicly available at this time.
Eventually, Major-Gen Mamman Vatsa, Lt. Col. Musa Bitiyong, Lt. Col. Christian A. Oche, Lt. Col. Michael A. Iyorshe, Major D. I. Bamidele, Commander A. A.
Ogwiji, Wing Commander B. E. N. Ekele, Wing Commander Adamu C. Sakaba, Squadron Leader Martin Olufolorunsho Luther, and Squadron Leader A. Ahura were executed on March 5, 1986.
The late Brigadier Malami Nassarawa's case was very curious and unfortunate. As Commandant of the School of Infantry, he was reportedly arraigned for allegedly plotting a separate coup of his own. When absolutely no evidence was adduced for that charge, he was accused of "insufficient loyalty" and then accused of conduct prejudicial to discipline, and then dismissed from the Army. Then he was retried, and again acquitted. His acquittal was upheld by the AFRC/PRC.
Nevertheless he still languished in jail for many months with deteriorating health until his release was ordered by the Joint Chiefs Chairman. Someday his case definitely will make for an interesting movie.
WHY WERE VATSA AND THE OTHERS SHOT?
In his landmark contribution to Nigerian military literature, titled "The Federal Republic of Nigeria Army", a former Army Chief, Major General MC Alli, wrote: "The soldier poet and poultry farmer, the peoples' General Mamman Vatsa, a minority of Nupe extraction from Niger State of Nigeria, allegedly masterminded the coup of 1986. It falls into the same category with General Babangida's coup [against Buhari]. It was motivated by an initial resentment immediately after the overthrow of General Buhari. It cannot entirely be divorced from the incipient rivalry that lay latent between Generals Vatsa and Babangida, both from Niger State and of a common alma mater...No major tribe of regional group of political import can be identified. Its conspirators comprised a motley of minorities of diverse background with a rallying point clubbed around General Vatsa's charisma. Curbed in the embryo and tried in secrecy, their subsequent execution left understandable incredulity and doubt in the nobility of the regime it sought to overthrow.
....It failed because a mole compromised it. The conspirators did not fall within the mainstream of the Army's stock of professional coup merchants and artisans. Furthermore the regime of General Babangida had consolidated its tentacles on the network of national power through generous patronage and populist posturing. This explains his audacity in executing General Vatsa, notwithstanding national and international appeals for reprieve. General Babangida told me he was personally grieved by the insinuation that he executed the plotters because they were largely Christians. The pressure to execute them arose from the Plateau officers' axis. Their officers had been victims of the same military tradition and laws..[i.e. during the Dimka coup of 1976]." However, Babangida himself has gone on to make additional comments clarifying why they were shot.
During an interview with Eni-B of THIS DAY Newspapers in 2001 shortly after he turned 60, this is how (according to Eni-B) General Babangida justified the execution of General Vatsa and others in 1986: "...Babangida said it was after Vatsa's coup was foiled that he realised his childhood friend and classmate planned the coup in line with a deep-seated personal rivalry, going back to their days as young officers. He said that unconsciously he and Vatsa had been great competitors; that as a young officer, whatever he did Vatsa equally did and whatever Vatsa achieved, he also went after. He said it was Lt. Gen. T.Y. Danjuma who pointed this out to him from their military records.
Babangida gave this rationalisation to justify why he could not pardon Vatsa. He said when he first heard his childhood friend was planning a coup, he decided to do nothing but monitor him. He said however that Vatsa came to him to complain thus, "You heard I was planning a coup and couldn't even ask me. What kind of friend are you?" To this Babangida said he replied thus, "I didn't believe it or are you planning a coup?" He said Vatsa replied in the negative and the matter was forgotten until there was evidence of the plot. He said he instructed that Vatsa be arrested and detained so as not to allow him impede investigation.
"However, he tried to escape through the air condition hole. I couldn't understand why he was trying to escape if he was not involved in a coup plot," Babangida said. He added with a frown, "But while watching the video of his execution, I turned my eyes away when I saw him remove his watch and ask a soldier to give his wife. I couldn't continue watching." He said he couldn't retire or imprison Vatsa because he believed the guy could still have planned a coup either in retirement or in prison. "Rawlings did it in Ghana and you know Vatsa was very stubborn," he said."
THE LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE VATSA CONSPIRACY TRIALS
At this juncture, given the paucity of public information, one can only provide a limited perspective. Hopefully someday, all the official records will be released.
The execution of Mamman Vatsa and others on March 5, 1986 was the first time the charge of 'conspiracy to commit treason' was being punished with the death sentence in Nigeria. Until then 'conspiracy' in independent Nigeria had always been classified as a "treasonable felony" rather than "treason". It attracted long prison sentences such as was the case with Chief Awolowo and others in 1962/63 and Bukar Mandara in 1982. Planning or conceptualizing a coup was not regarded as the same as actually carrying it out (as was the case with Dimka and others in 1976).
It may be argued whether the conspiracy proceedings that led to the execution of Banjo, Ifeajuna, Alale and Agbam in 1967 in Biafra fall into this category (Details of these executions will be featured in forthcoming WEEKEND MUSINGS).
This legal issue needs to be clarified as are related matters regarding the protections of rights of persons undergoing military courts martial as guaranteed under the Nigerian Constitution which is supreme. Too many injustices have been swept under the carpet.
Other than the officers executed and jailed, many were retired or dismissed arbitrarily some for merely being neighbors to those convicted, others for being "too serious". Others had their names splashed across TV screens in Nigeria as suspects in a burst of pre-coup trial propaganda, only for their innocence to be later established behind closed doors. The decimation of the principled element of the officer corps was relentless but, thankfully, never really completely succeeded. The fiscal and human resource loss to Nigerian society was also immense.
Many of the officers executed were of the highest caliber in the military, had required years of expensive training to produce, and were looked upon as models of professional military excellence. Like the C-130 crash that occurred some years later, it was a national tragedy. In furtherance of the climate of suspicion between the regime and the core military, some military services were defanged.
The systematic destruction of the Air Force, for example, started with those executions.
Training and arming were severely curtailed. Even elementary items like jet fuel supplies to Air Force Bases were monitored and became centrally controlled.
Until the advent of civil rule 13 years later in 1999, the air force did not get a chance to rebuild and reprofessionalize. What little serious professional activity took place occurred in the setting of Liberian and Sierra Leonean operations.
In the army, officers became increasingly suspicious of one another and esprit de Corps was undermined - just as the military was beginning to emerge from the terrible events of the late sixties and the hiccup of 1976. "Settlement" became the order of the day. Lt. Col. Mike Iyorshe's worst fears came to pass. The decay was later captured in public comments made by former Army Chief General Saliu Ibrahim, himself initially a suspect in the rash of arrests back in 1985 when he was head of the Army faculty at Jaji . The "Rawlings" rationalization for the executions in spite of pleas for clemency is short sighted. Houphouet Boigny, for example, never one day executed anyone for planning a coup against him. The regime may have felt the executions sent a message to future conspirators and would deter coups and secure the project. But it did not. A very violent attempt took place in April 1990 and the spokesman for that effort cited the executions of Vatsa and others in 1986 as one of several reasons.
The experience of the Vatsa conspiracy trial and aftermath, among others has led some serious observers, like General MC Alli, to appeal to the government to establish a "coup commission" to look back into the crypts of our national history and exorcise some ghosts. Lastly, the practice of holding on to corpses of executed servicemen, burying them enmasse, and denying family burial rites is antithetical to African culture. I, for one, have appealed before and will appeal again that the remains of those shot over the years for real and imagined coups should be returned to their families for proper burial after forensic identification. Then the healing can begin.
MAJOR-GENERAL MAMMAN VATSA
Major General Mamman Vatsa was born on Dec 3, 1940. After attending secondary school at the Government Secondary School Bida, Niger State, he joined the Nigerian Army on the December 10, 1962. Following preparatory training at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna, he was sent to the Indian Military Academy.
General Vatsa attended many military courses inside and outside the country during his career - including Intelligence, Security, Policy and Strategic Studies, Equitation, Physical Training, among others. He ascended through all the officer ranks of the Army from 2/Lt to Major-General, and was Command and Staff College certified (psc). He commanded the 21 battalion during the civil war and was one of the few officers who actually wrote academic articles about the operational aspects of certain battles. After the war ended in 1970, he was an instructor at the Nigerian Defence Academy, before being posted as a Principal Staff Officer at Army HQ. Subsequently, he commanded the 30 Infantry Brigade (Ogoja) until July 1975, 13 Infantry Brigade (Calabar) until February 1976, and the Brigade of Guards until 1979. It was during his tenure that the HQ of the Bde of Gds was moved from Dodan Barracks to its Kofo Abayomi location in Victoria Island before transfer to Abuja.
When then Colonel Vatsa was commanding the 13 Bde in Calabar, it was he who first took to the airwaves to oppose the February 13, 1976 coup of Lt. Col Dimka. During the Dimka coup investigation, Vatsa was Secretary of the Court-Martial Tribunal. It was from that position that he became the Commander, Bde of Gds under then C-in-C, Lt. Gen Obasanjo
Vatsa was Commandant of the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI) from late 1979. He, along with Lt. Col Bitiyong developed the Special Warfare Wing - and established the doctrinal basis for the establishment of the 82nd Composite Division of the Nigerian Army in Enugu. In fact it was Vatsa who suggested that the Division be called the 82nd Div – after the 82nd West African Division in Burma. Lt. Col. Musa Bitiyong was tasked by Vatsa to establish the first Airborne battalion in the Nigerian Army.
In 1981, when Cameroon soldiers shot and killed five (5) Nigerian soldiers in the disputed Bakassi area, then Brigadier Vatsa was named the Commander of the Joint Military Task Force during the massive border mobilization along the entire length of the Nigeria-Cameroon border. It was he who developed the operational plan of attack through Garoua in northern Cameroon, which was approved in principle by the National Defence Council, pending the outcome of diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. But one of his rivals at the Army HQ then leaked the operational plan to French Intelligence, which in turn leaked it to President Ahidjo. According to former President Shagari’s memoirs, it is still not known to this day who did and why. Eventually, Cameroon apologized to Nigeria and that particularly dangerous episode in the border dispute was resolved.
Later on, during the latter part of the regime of President Shehu Shagari, Vatsa was made the Quarter-Master General (QMG), the post he held as of the time of the coup of December 1983. He was on leave during the Buhari coup against Shagari and did not take part. During the August 27 1985 Babangida take-over, General Vatsa was in Mecca with Major General Tunde Idiagbon on pilgrimage.
As of the time of his arrest in December that year, on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason he was the Federal Minister for the Federal Capital Territory. He was a member of the AFRC, Federal Executive Council and occasionally, the National Council of States, the only military officer, other than the C-in-C, to be a member of all three ruling bodies.
Married, with four kids, General Vatsa’s extra-regimental accomplishments include publications as a poet and author e.g. Voices from the Trench, Ufoma and other Poems, and others; conferment with a National Award, as Officer of the Federal Republic (OFR 1979), conferment with a Gold Medal from the Bulgarian Union of Writers as well as a Merit Award from the University of Ife. His hobbies included man watching, photography, gardening and horse-riding. He died on March 5, 1986 by Firing Squad.
____________________________
LT. COL. AKER MICHAEL IYORSHE
At the time he was arrested sometime between 18th and 20th December 1985 on suspicion of conspiracy to overthrow the military regime of Major General Babangida, Lt. Col. Michael Aker Iyorshe (N/2242), an infantry officer of Christian faith from the Tiv nationality in Benue state, was 35 years old. He was a Directing Staff (DS), Senior Division, Army Faculty, at the Command and Staff College in Jaji.
Mike Iyorshe attended the Nigerian Military School Zaria. He was commissioned in 1970 after graduating from the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) in Kaduna. He was an Academy Junior Under-Officer (JUO) and later won the distinguished Sword of Honor as the best cadet.
He attended several courses overseas (all on merit), including the Junior Staff College in Toronto (Canada), Junior Land Force, Command and Staff College, Kingston, Ontario (Canada) and the Army Staff College in Camberly (UK). He had the best performance in the Lt. to Captain and Captain to Major promotion exams in his batch. He and Lt. Col. M. Effiong (who was his coursemate) became substantive Lt. Cols before all others in their course, sometime in 1984.
Early in his career, Mike commanded a company and then became ADC to the GOC 3rd Div when it was in Port Harcourt; (then Colonel, later Brigadier Danjuma). He also got appointed as the Military Assistant to the Chief of Army Staff when Danjuma later became COAS after 1975. When he returned from Camberly, as a Major, Iyorshe was the only Major in the Nigerian Army who was posted to command a full Battalion at Birnin Kebbi (as a field Lt. Col). In part preparation for a possible assignment in Lebanon, this battalion, (81 Bn) gained respect under his command as the most physically fit and combat ready battalion in the Army at one time, able to deploy in less than an hours notice. In 1982 he was posted to the Brigade of Guards in Lagos as Brigade Major - position he held until early 1984 after the Buhari coup when he was posted to Jaji.
At the Command and Staff College, Kingston, Ontario, he was the best foreign student. At Camberly, he held the highest rank in field exercises. Among all the African students that attended the staff course, he was the only one that was allowed to operate as a Brigade Commander to play the role of Brigadier at major tactical exercises.
In Ali Mazrui's famous TV series on Africa, Lt. Col Mike Iyorshe was interviewed at Jaji.
Hobbies: Sports, Physical conditioning, Military History, Military Writing (He wrote several articles in the Army newspaper, Soja)
Social: Married with five children
Death: March 5, 1986 by Firing Squad
_____________________
LT. COL. CHRISTIAN OCHE
At the time of his arrest in December 1985 on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason, Lt. Col. Christian A. Oche (N/1891) was Colonel, General Staff (GS) at the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Apapa, Lagos. In this position he was second only to the Director of Military Intelligence within the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps. Lt. Col. Christian Oche was from Benue State.
After secondary school, he trained at the Nigerian Defence Academy from 1968 to 1970 when he was commissioned 2/Lt as a regular combatant. In 1974 he attended the Junior Staff Course at the Army Junior Division of the Joint Services Command and Staff College at Watchfield/Shrivenham in the United Kingdom. He also did the Intelligence Staff Course. From late 1974 to 1975 he was Deputy
Adjutant and GSO3 at the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna. At the time of the coup that removed General Gowon in July 1975, Oche was the Brigade Major in the Brigade of Guards under then Colonel Joseph Nanven Garba. After that coup he served as the Military Assistant to Lt. Gen. TY Danjuma, then Chief of Army Staff until 1977/78 when that position was taken over by Michael Aker Iyorshe. Oche attended the Command and Staff College, Jaji between 1979 and 1980 and graduated psc.
After completing his Senior Staff College course at Jaji, he attended the University of Oklahoma in the USA where he obtained a BA (French) and Masters Degree in International Relations. He returned in late 1983 just before the Buhari coup that removed President Shagari. In 1984/85 he served as the General Staff Officer (Intelligence and Security) at the Supreme Headquarters in Dodan Barracks under then Lt. Col Mohammed Christopher Ali, who was at that time Acting Director of Joint Services under the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Major General Tunde Idiagbon. After the Babangida coup against Buhari on August 27, 1985, he was posted to the Military Intelligence HQ as the Colonel GS.
Social: Married with Five (5) children
Death: March 5, 1986 by Firing Squad
_________________
LT. COL. MUSA BITIYONG
At the time of his arrest in Decmber 1985 on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason, Lt. Colonel Musa Bitiyong was Director of Logistic Planning at the Army HQ in Lagos. He enlisted in the Army as a pupil at the Nigerian Military School Zaria on January 23, 1961 where he was two years senior to Mike Iyorshe. He was commissioned during the civil war on August 1st, 1967 in the United Kingdom. I believe he completed a short service officer program but I am in the process of confirming from relevant training institutions in Britain. He, like former Army Chief Major Gen. MC Alli, was an emergency Commissioned (EC) Officer because of the exigencies of the time. He fought during the civil war and had an excellent reputation as a brilliant and very very tough young infantry officer. After the civil war he attended the Infantry Officers Basic and Defence Course in the United States followed by Airborne training, also in the US. Bitiyong was among the first three or four Nigerians to be airborne qualified. He later attended the United States Marine Command Course as well as the US Marine Staff College. At the time he was arrested on suspicion of conspiracy he had been nominated to attend the Royal College of Defence Studies in the UK - a War College Equivalent course usually reserved for senior Colonels transitioning to junior Brigadiers. Bitiyong held a number of important positions during his career. He was Deputy Commandant at the Army School of Infantry from 1979-81 where he was deputy to then Commandant Brigadier Vatsa and was credited with establishing the
airborne training program. He then commanded the 7th Infantry Brigade in Sokoto for about 6 months before being redeployed to simultaneously command the 130th Battalion at Ikom and the 13th Amphibious Brigade in Calabar. From 1982 to 83 he was the Colonel AQ at the 82 Div HQ in Enugu. In that position he helped establish the first AirBorimage of a "can do" "special forces" officer - "a soldier's soldier". Shortly after Zimbabwe became independent, he was part of a team that went to Zimbabwe in June 1980 to recruit former guerrillas to come back to Nigeria to train at the Nigerian Defence Academy. The other members of that team were late Brigadier Bako, then Air Commodore Okpere, then Group Captain Afolabi and a civil servant. Because of the uncertain security situation the others returned to Nigeria while Bitiyong was left behind to roam around the bushes of Zimbabwe in guerrilla camps. He recruited 100 former ZANLA/ZAPLA guerrillas and then returned again in December to recruit an additional 50. After the Buhari coup of Dec 1983, Bitiyong was tasked with others to take over the Armored Vehicles that had been purchased by former Police IG Adewusi with President Shagari's blessing. Bitiyong also served on a host of other panels including the Ministry of Defence Contracts Review Panel and the Military Religion Proliferation Board. Social: Married with 5 kids Personal Interests: Military History, Farming, Real Estate Death: Mar 5, 1986 by Firing Squad
______________________
WING COMMANDER BEN EKELE
At the time he was arrested on Dec 17th, 1985 and charged for conspiracy to commit treason, Wing Commander Ben Ekele was 36 years old and an Igala from Benue State he was a Fighter Pilot and Commander of the Air Defence Group based at the NAF Base Makurdi.
He began his flying career in 1969 after completion of basic flying training. In 1971 he was deployed to the operational conversion squadron first on the Czech made L-29 Delphin, then the MiG 15, and then on to the MiG 17. He went to the Soviet Union in 1974 for conversion to the MiG 21 (training and fighter versions). From 1976 to 1977 he was sent to the Royal AirForce in Britain where he qualified on the Jet Provost Marks 4 & 5 and also flew the Gnat fighter and Hawker Siddeley Hawk, in addition to attending a weapons employment course. Missile training took place at armament camps in Sardinia, Italy and the west coast of Wales (Abeforth). From September 1977 until December 1980, Ben Ekele set up Nigeria's first Mig 21 operational conversion unit as the Officer Commanding. Ekele trained practically the entire first generation of locally trained Nigerian MiG 21 pilots. From December 1980 until December 1981 he attended the Joint Services Staff College in Wellington India. When he came back from India he was simultaneously appointed the Staff Officer, Operations Strike Group and the Officer Commanding the Operational
Conversion Unit and the Air Defence Unit all based in Makurdi. Then Squadron Leader Ekele was the ground commentator during the fly past of AirForce jets at the 1982 Independence parade in Abuja, while then Major Iyorshe organized the ground parade. After the Buhari coup of Dec 1983, Ekele was promoted and became the Commander of the combined Strike Group (comprising MiG 21s for interception/air defence and the SEPECAT Jaguar for Ground Attack/Strike) and NAF Station Commandant. On November 11, 1984 the Strike Group was split into Strike and Air Defence groups respectively, relieving Ekele of simultaneous control of both groups of aircraft. A new Station Commandant was appointed in the reorganization. Wing Commander Ekele took part in several AirCraft Acquisition Evaluation trips on behalf of Nigeria. In 1978 he was on the team that assessed the French Mirage F-1. In 1980 he was on the team that evaluated the Sia Machetti 260, the Agusta 109 helicopter and the MB339 jet trainer. In September 1984 he went to the USSR to familiarize himself with the new MiG 21B air-superiority fighter which Nigeria had acquired. During that visit he also took part in negotiations with the Russians to purchase more modern bombs for the MiGs. Apparently the Russians had been supplying Nigeria with WW2 stock bombs with large profile - which increased fuel consumption merely for flying during operations. In Nov 1984 he was in the US evaluating the F-20 Tiger Shark. In 1985 he was sent to India to evaluate the HP 34 Hindustan Aeronautic Trainer (Indian version of the Agusta). During the Nigeria-Chad border conflict of 1983 Ekele led a strike aircraft group that straffed islands in the Kinasara area of the Chad basin, in support of the 21st Armoured Brigade to repel the Chadian invasion. He also commanded the AirForce detachment during Operation SeaDog in Calabar – a joint exercise designed to test responses to situations in the Bakassi area. Interestingly Lt. Col. Bitiyong was an observer during that exercise. Social: Married Death: March 5, 1986 by Firing Squad
__________________________
WING COMMANDER ADAMU SAKABA
At the time he was arrested at 3am on Dec 17th 1985 in his house in Makurdi, on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason, Wing Commander Adamu Chema Sakaba, then Commanding Officer, Central Armament Engineering Depot, was 38 years old. A Christian by faith, AS Sakaba was born in Zuru, present day Kebbi State in April 1947.
Sakaba attended secondary school in Bida, Niger State, and enlisted in the Air Force on September 4, 1967. He graduated NDACE from the Nigerian Defence Academy with the 3rd regular intake. A distinguished Science Graduate, he graduated with very high marks in Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry.
He attended the Royal AirForce Technical College at Cranwell in Lincolnshire ("Bomber County"), UK for 18 months and graduated with a Military Engineering Diploma in Aircraft Armament. He subsequently attended the Engineers Management and Technical Instructors Course also in the UK before the Senior Officers Staff Course in the USA. Sakaba took the Typewriting course on MiGs 15
& 17 in the Soviet Union before attending the Military University in Kiev, where he graduated in Guided Weapons Technology. Indeed, at the time of his arrest, Wing Commander Sakaba was the only Nigerian ever trained in Guided Weapons Technology. He also attended the Command and Staff College Jaji in Nigeria.
Over the course of his career he held several appointments, one of which was as Air Officer Commanding the NAF Technical Officers School, Ground Training Group, Kaduna. In this capacity Sakaba trained many of Nigeria's AirForce Maintenance Technicians and Engineers.
Wing Commander Sakaba led an engineering team which tried its best to dispose of many unserviceable bombs in the NAF inventory. He is on record as having made spirited efforts to improve the storage of over 8000 bombs over the years - often to no avail. Some of the bombs in Nigeria's inventory were of 1956 vintage, carelessly left lying in the open with all the effects of heat, humidity and rain since the end of the civil war.
Social: Married, with 4 children.
Death: Mar 5, 1986 by Firing Squad
___________________
MAJOR DANIEL BAMIDELE
At the time he was arrested on or about December 20, 1985 on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason, Major Daniel Idowu Bamidele (N/1436), an officer of Yoruba nationality was 37 years old. He was a Directing Staff, Junior Division, Army Faculty, Command and Staff College, Jaji with a direct reporting relationship to Brigadier Saliu Ibrahim who was at that time the Director of the Army Faculty. Bamidele worked closely with Iyorshe at Jaji. Major DI Bamidele held a short service commission, having joined the Nigerian Army as a soldier in 1968 during the civil war. He fought during the war as a soldier in the 12th Commando Brigade (3rd Div initially under Colonel Adekunle and later Obasanjo). He was commissioned on July 29, 1970 as an officer after formal training at the Nigerian Defence Academy. He was the first Nigerian MTO of the Nigerian Defence Academy. He was then deployed to the 12th Infantry Brigade at Aba as a company commander (where he briefly served alongside then Lt. Iyorshe). In 1974 he went to the UK for military training - the details of which are still being researched. Shortly thereafter, he was nominated for advanced infantry training in the US. He graduated from the advanced US Army Infantry course at Fort Benning, Georgia with outstanding recommendations - which led to a personal letter of commendation from then Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. TY Danjuma. Bamidele attended the junior division of the Ghana Staff College Teshie, Ghana where he also distinguished himself, attaining the highest rank of command during the final military exercise. He was enrolled in the 3rd Command and Staff College Senior Course, Jaji from 1980 to 1981 and graduated in the top 5%. Bamidele held a number of interesting appointments during his career. From 1976-79 he was Grade II Staff Officer in the "G" Branch (operations) at Army HQ. When he returned from Teshie in 1979 he was appointed Grade II Staff
Officer for Training at the Nigerian Defence Academy. After completing senior division staff training at Jaji he was made the General Staff Officer 2 (Operations and Training) at the HQ of the 3rd Armored Division in Jos. During this tour of duty he got nominated for service abroad. In 1982 he was the Operations Officer for the Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT) as part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This was the Nigerian Battalion in Lebanon at the time of the Israeli invasion. Indeed it was the last Nigerian Battalion deployed there - President Shagari pulled Nigeria out of UNIFIL thereafter. Upon his return from Lebanon, Major Bamidele was the operations officer for the 3Div HQ during the border war with Chad. In October 1983 during an official trip to Kaduna to print his Divisional brief for the Chief of Army Staff Conference, Daniel Bamidele heard of rumors about a planned coup against President Shagari. When he returned to Jos he promptly reported to his GOC, then Brigadier M. Buhari (who, unknown to Bamidele at that time was in the thick of the plot). A week later, Bamidele found himself on a plane to Lagos, detained by the Directorate of Military Intelligence at Tego Barracks and accused of plotting a coup against Shagari!! Fake witnesses were paraded and a mock interrogation contrived, while reports were being made to the NSO (then under Shinkafi) to mislead the Shagari regime. Meanwhile the real plot continued underground with the full involvement of the same Military Intelligence group that was interrogating him.
Finally, on November 25, 1983 with no credible witness to nail him, and no legal basis to charge him for a one man conspiracy, Bamidele was released. He returned to Jos, befuddled about what had actually transpired, until on January 1, 1984 his own GOC, Brigadier Buhari, to whom he had reported the plot emerged as the new Head of State! It was then he made the connection. In early 1984, Bamidele's name was listed for retirement. However, when the list got to Buhari for approval, he crossed Bamidele's name out - recognizing that the officer was caught in a complex vortex and web of intrigue. After being saved from retirement at the last minute he got deployed to Jaji as a Directing Staff. Social: Married with kids. Hobbies: Squash Death: March 5, 1986 by firing squad
________________________
SQUADRON LEADER MARTIN LUTHER
At the time he was arrested on December 20, 1985 on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason, Squadron Martin Olufolorunsho Luther was 33 years old. He was the Staff Officer (Ops) in the Presidential Aircraft Fleet (227 Executive Wing). Martin was born in Lagos on April 17, 1952 to Martin Obafemi Luther of the Taiwolu family, a descendant of the Royal House of Isheri and Christiana Idowu Ayinke Elliott. He attended St. Gregory's College, Lagos where he was sort of a "boy" to Wing Commander John Uku. In fact it was Uku's decision to join the Air Force that motivated Luther to do the same. An avid sportsman, Luther was a member of the National Basketball Team under then Lt. Col and later Major General Joseph Garba (rtd). He also played squash
and had interests in current affairs. He enlisted in the Nigerian Air Force in July 1970, and was initially trained at the Nigerian Defence Academy where he got his commission in 1971. He graduated at the top of group during primary flying training in Kaduna on the basis of which he was sent to the US for undergraduate training as a Pilot. When he returned in 1973, he was initially deployed to the Czech L-29 fighter jet trainer on track for a career as a fighter pilot. However, Luther was so big that the canopy could not be closed whenever he wore his safety helmet. So he flew fighter jets without a helmet. No-one thought much of this until a Russian General on a courtesy visit witnessed it himself just as Luther was going out on a mission. The General pointed out that in the event of an ejection Luther would crush his skull against the canopy. That was when the Nigerian Air Force realized that he had to be rerouted to a career as a transport pilot. He was initially asked to fly light transport aircraft (like the Dornier) on relief missions but was then shifted to the Fokker F-27 (military version)
When the Nigerian AirForce took over responsibility for executive transportation he was one of the first three Pilots deployed to fly Nigerian leaders on a variety of aircraft. During the Chadian OAU peace operation, Luther was in charge of the NAF Recce group based in Maiduguri. He flew numerous missions into and over Chad landing at many dirt airstrips in support of the mission. By the time he was arrested for the Vatsa Conspiracy he had logged 3,800 flying hours - one of the highest hours for any military pilot in Africa of that rank. Social: Married, 4 kids Death: March 5, 1986 by firing squad
____________________
NOTE: Bio sketches on Squadron Leader Ahura and Commander Ogwiji will be posted in forthcoming Musings
____________________
Some others:
WING COMMANDER J B UKU
At the time he was "invited" from his office at the NAF HQ on January 8, 1986 on suspicion of violating Section 40 (2) of the Nigerian Criminal code, with respect to the "Vatsa Conspiracy", Wing Commander John B. Uku, was 35 years old. An Itsekiri from Delta State (then Bendel) he was a combat Pilot and certified Pilot Instructor who joined the Air Force in August 1970. Wing Commander Uku graduated as the best in Flying and academics during both the Nigerian Air Force primary and basic flying courses between 1970 and 1974.
Upon completion of this phase of his training in Nigeria he was sent to the Soviet Union to train on the MiGs 17 and 21. He returned in 1976 and became the Officer Commanding the MiG 17 Defence Flying Training Wing in Kano. Shortly
thereafter he left for Britain. In 1977 he graduated from the Royal AirForce Flying School as a qualified Flying Instructor. In 1978 he was made the Officer Commanding the NAF Basic Flying Training Wing, Kano where he taught undergraduate pupil officers how to fly up to Wing level. In 1979 he attended the Nigerian Air Force Junior Division Staff Course in Kaduna and graduated with three "A"s.
In 1980 he attended the French Air Force Alpha Jet training program. After this he was nominated for the Royal Air Force Staff College at Bracknell in Britain from where he graduated with a A-. When he returned from Bracknell he was made Staff Officer (1) Operations and Training at the Flying Training Group in Kano.
In 1984 he proceeded on an Alfa Jet Weapons Instructor Course with the German Air Force, following which he became Commanding Officer of the Weapons Training School. That School was initially based in Kano before being moved to Kainji.
At the new Kainji Alfa Jet airbase, Wing Commander Uku assumed the position of NAF Station Commandant as well as being the Commanding Officer of the Air Weapons School. This was the position he was holding when approached on October 29, 1985 by a fellow officer and told of discontent in the Army among some "high minded officers", asked whether the NAF could play any role in a coup, and asked whether his Alpha Jets were armed. He told the officer off and warned him to steer clear of any plot.
However, again on December 10 he was approached by Another officer for about 2 minutes after an AOC meeting in Makurdi and asked if he had been approached by any Army officer. Uku again told this officer that he had not been so approached but warned him to stay out of any plot.
Uku had just been redeployed from Kainji as of January 1, 1986 to Lagos to assume the position of Group Captain (Operations) in the Directorate of Operations at NAF HQ. He held that post for 7 days before his arrest for "concealment of treason". Although he made many attempts to see the Chief of Air Staff about the matter, all to no avail, these were not considered enough. During the course of his career, Wing Commander Uku sat on several sensitive Boards for the Air Force. He was among those who made the decisions on weapon fit for the Nigerian version of the Alpha Jet. He also helped write the NAF Doctrine and drew up the contingency plan for the Tactical Air Command.
Uku was primarily responsible for organizing air support for military exercises at the Nigerian Defence Academy and the Command and Staff College. One noteworthy exercise he supported was Exercise "Iron Fist" which took place in Kaduna. Uku was also the mock "Enemy Air Force Commander" during Exercise 'Sea Dog' at Calabar.
Social: Married with kids
Outcome of Arrest: Recommended for life sentence with leniency
____________________
MAJOR DE WEST
When he was arrested on January 1, 1986 on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason, Major DE West (N/2387), an officer from the Ijaw nationality was 38 years old, and married with five kids. He was the Commanding Officer of the 342 Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment in Zaria. He was commissioned in March 1972 as a regular combatant officer. Over the course of his career he attended the following courses: 1. Young Officers Course (Artillery) - Kaduna, Nigeria 2. Regimental Gunnery course, Pakistan 3. Anti-Ballistic Meteorology Course, USA 4. Electronic and Commissioned Artillery Staff Officers Course, USA 5. Junior Staff College, Teshie, Ghana 6. Long Gunnery Staff Course, USA 7. Battalion Commanders Course, School of Infantry, Jaji 9. Command and Staff College (Senior), Jaji An outstanding and highly trained officer, he held several important positions during his career. He had been a Battery Commander, a Brigade Major, a Staff Officer at the Artillery Corps HQ and a Commanding Officer of an Artillery regiment. In fact, even though merely a Major, he was actually the Acting Commander of the Artillery Brigade in Jos in late December 1985 when the substantive Commander was away on leave. His artillery regiment in Zaria was primarily responsible for providing artillery support for military exercises at the Command and Staff College in Jaji. It was armed with guns and howitzers of the 105, 122, and 155 mm caliber in addition to air-defence weapons. _____________________
MAJOR TOBIAS AKWASHIKI
At the time of his arrest on or about January 1st, 1986 on suspicion of conspiracy to commit treason, Major TG Akwashiki (N/2389) was the Commander, 6 Guards Battalion, Bonny Camp, Victoria Island, Lagos. An indigene of then Plateau (now Nassarawa) State, Tobias was commissioned on March 11, 1972 at the Nigerian Defence Academy as part of the 7th Regular course. He was a coursemate of Majors Onyeke and West. When he left the academy he was appointed a company commander with the 7th Brigade. Six months later he was redeployed to Depot, Nigerian Army, Zaria as adjutant under then Brigadier AS Wali. He held this position for three years. (NB: Depot is the Army's training institution for soldiers) After the coup against Gowon, he was deployed to Lagos as a personnel staff officer in the "A" branch under Musa Bitiyong who was then Director of Personnel. Shortly thereafter, Akwashiki was sent to Lebanon as adjutant and a company commander in the first Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT 1) in UNIFIL, commanded by then Lt. Col Lawrence Uwumarogie. When he returned from Lebanon he was posted to the Nigerian Defence Academy as a Company Commander after which he very briefly served as acting CO of the 81 Battalion. From 1981-82 Akwashiki attended the Command and Staff College Jaji. He was then deployed to Lagos as Military Assistant to Lt. Gen GS Jalo, then Chief of Defence Staff. This was the position Akwashiki was holding when President Shagari was overthrown on December 31, 1983.
After Buhari came to power, TG Akwashiki was posted to Supreme HQ as Staff Officer for finance and administration under Tunde Idiagbon. This was the position he was holding when General Babangida removed Buhari from power. Major Akwashiki was then posted by the Army to Minna in Niger State as the Brigade Major. However, before he could take up that official assignment, he was approached informally by Majors Sambo Dasuki and Lawan Gwadabe and requested to take command of the 6th Battalion in Lagos - a sensitive unit responsible in part for the security of the Presidential lodge at Dodan Barracks. He agreed. In this position he was Camp Commandant for the State House on Ribadu Road.
______________
BRIGADIER MALAMI NASSARAWA
Brigadier MM Nassarawa, a Muslim officer, joined the Nigerian Army on March 16, 1963. He underwent military training in Canada and was commissioned in 1964 in Canada. He returned to Nigeria in 1965. During the crises of 1966 he was a junior officer in the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja Cantonment in Lagos. Over the course of his career he fought in the civil war, and held many staff and operational positions in the Army HQ, Depot Zaria, TRADOC etc.. He attended many courses and graduated from Staff College. He was Adjutant-General of the Army in the early eighties (under President Shagari), appointed to the Special Military Tribunal (Lagos) by General Buhari, and was posted to the School of Infantry as Commandant in September 1985 after Babangida came to power.